Can a True Finn Speak Swedish?
The Swedish Language in the Finns Party Discourse

Hasan Akintug ´

Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies,
3(1) 2019, 28–39

URL: http://jass.ax/volume-3-issue-1-Akintug/

Abstract

This paper aims to analyse the rhetorical utilisation of Swedish language in the discourse of the Finns Party. This contribution will provide an overview of the history of Swedish language in Finland and will attempt to analyse the relationship between the two language groups. This contribution will analyse the rhetorical uses of Swedish language within the discourse of the Finns Party with the intention to highlight the consistently negative portrayals of Swedish language and its status. It will be argued that the historical experience of the inequality of status between the Swedish and Finnish languages have been politicised by the Finns Party as a part of its ethno-nationalist and populist conceptualisation of the Finnish identity.

Keywords

Rhetoric, Nationalism, Populism, Identity, Discourse

About the author: Hasan Akintug holds a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science and Public Administration from Hacettepe University and is currently a student at the University of Helsinki, European and Nordic Studies Master's program. He has worked as a research assistant at IKME Sociopolitical Studies Institute, the Åland Islands Peace Institute and the Centre for European Studies at the University of Helsinki. His main research interests include minorities and autonomous regions.

1. Introduction

The Swedish language has been one of the eternal issues of Finnish politics. Its position as a *de jure* equal language to Finnish language has been subject to varying degrees of criticism by various political actors in Finland. Arguably, one of the harshest criticisms comes from the (True) Finns Party, who when the chance is provided challenges the status of the language in the context of Finland. In this short article, the Swedish language and its status will be analysed both in its historical context in Finland and in the contemporary Finns Party rhetoric to argue for a continued politicization of the historical position of Swedish language in Finland through a populist framework. Furthermore, it will be argued that the old connotations of the Swedish speaking "elite" and the old (and quite unequal) power dynamics between Swedish language and Finnish still find their way in to the contemporary Finnish political discourse. In the first section, an attempt will be made to briefly summarize the linguistic situation in Finland in three periods: Finland under Swedish rule, Finland as a Grand Duchy under Russia, and independent Finland. In this section, the focus will revolve around the *Fennoman-Svecoman* divide in the late 19th century to highlight that although the divide itself is no longer a primary issue, the memory of it is still very much operationalized, particularly by opponents of the status and usage of Swedish language in Finland. In the second section, cases of this operationalization of the historical status of Swedish found implicitly and explicitly in the rhetoric and discourse of the Finns Party will be highlighted. Through analysis of the populist attitudes of the Finns Party organization and its representatives two main arguments will be put forward: firstly, the idea that Swedish represents the "upper classes" and secondly, that Swedish is an alien element which, still persists as a "spectre" of the historically unequal relationship between the two languages in Finland.

2. Swedish Language in Finland during three Periods

2.1 The Swedish Period

For a period lasting over six centuries, Finland remained an integrated part of the Swedish Kingdom. It would not be much of an exaggeration to claim that this historical experience has left its mark on Finnish society up until the present day. The beginning of this period has been attributed by some to the 12th century excursion of the Swedish King Erix IX and the Bishop of Uppsala in 1155.[1] It must also be noted that some argue against this particular narrative of the introduction of Swedish language in Finland, and cite evidence

1 Singleton 1998, p. 18.

of earlier Swedish settlements in the 8th and 9th centuries.[2] The Swedish influence in Finland transitioned from missionary excursions to a locally administered medieval society, to a centrally governed kingdom, to an integrated part of the "Northern Power", and eventually the fall of Sweden as a "Northern Power", concluded with the transfer of power to the Russians in 1809. McRae notes that the two main social aspects that remained constant during the Swedish rule were the influence of the Western legal system and the importance of Christian religious organizations.[3] The incorporation of the area that was later to be called Finland to the Swedish realm also brought about significant change in terms of the linguistic composition of the area. After this incorporation, a number of Swedish speakers migrated to the south-west coastal areas of Finland, which roughly corresponds to the borders of "*Svenskfinland"*, which is a term still in use today. This situation had created a language boundary between the Swedish and Finnish speakers that remained relatively stable until the late 19th century.[4] Although no reliable statistics exist from the earlier stages of the Swedish rule, some speculate that roughly 78 percent of the region spoke Finnish, 20 percent spoke Swedish and 2 percent spoke German.[5]

At this point in history, as the Finnish language remained uncodified and its use was limited to speech, all official documents and communications were conducted in Swedish language. This situation changed in the 16th century through the efforts of Mikael Agricola[6], when the Finnish language was finally systematically organized and "elevated" to the level of a written language.[7] However, this did not translate into any form of real equality between the Swedish and Finnish languages. Especially during the 17th and 18th centuries the central administration of the Swedish Kingdom attempted to homogenize the realm in order to establish a uniform society with a majority of its total population as Swedish speakers. In this epoch of Finnish history, one could find the majority of the civilian population speaking Finnish both on the street and in church but the state administration, the judicial branch and the university (Kungliga Akademien in Turku; later the University of Helsinki) were all operating in Swedish. In this context, learning Swedish was not just a matter of language acquirement but also a matter of upwards social mobility.[8] In other words, one could claim that despite the majority status of Finnish in terms of demographics, Swedish language held a much more central position politically under the Swedish realm.

2 McRae 1999, p. 12.
3 Ibid.
4 Engman 1995, p. 179 and Allardt 1997, pp. 7–8.
5 Lavery 2006, p. 36.
6 A Finnish clergyman of the 16th century. As a student of Martin Luther he translated the Bible into Finnish language in 1554 and is widely celebrated as the "Father of Finnish Language" in Finland. The date 9 April is an official flag day in contemporary Finland which is dedicated to him. See Heininen 2017.
7 Singleton 1998, pp. 32–33.
8 Allardt 1977, p. 8.

2.2 The Russian Period

In 1809 with the Swedish loss of Finland to Russia, as declared in the Diet of Borgå, Finland had been granted its "elevation to the national status".[9] This was achieved through the special status of Finland as a Grand Duchy with a considerable amount of autonomy. The new situation in Finland allowed the continuation of the previous legal and social structures, meaning that the position of Swedish as the main language of the political unit continued under the rule of the Tsar. The establishment of the Grand Duchy of Finland also created a discrepancy between the Finnish speaking majority and the centrality of Swedish language to the administration. Previously, under the Swedish realm, the majority of the inhabitants (of the Kingdom as a whole) were Swedish speakers and Finnish speakers only constituted 22 percent of the total population. In this new political order, the balance shifted drastically in favour of Finnish speakers, who now made up 87 percent of the population.[10]

Indicative of the power structure between the two linguistic groups was the fact that despite a clear Finnish speaking majority, the estates of the clergy and the peasants had requested the continuation of Swedish language as the administrative language of the Grand Duchy.[11] In the early stages of the Grand Duchy, that is the first half of the 19th century, the Romantic interpretations of national identity which had taken a grip on other continental European nations had found their way to Finland as well. This form of nationalism found its intellectual basis in the thinking of German philosopher Herder who claimed language was the ultimate representative of the "spirit of the people" (*Volkgeist*).[12] In the Finnish context, this perception of nationalism had an issue to deal with: the Swedish language.

One of the earlier representatives of Finnish nationalism Adolf Ivar Ardwidson is frequently quoted (albeit with disputes regarding its authenticity) to claim that: "Swedes we are no longer, Russians we cannot be, therefore let us be Finns".[13] This statement, whether or not it was actually made, may be interpreted not only as a political positioning between Sweden and Russia through the unit of the Grand Duchy but perhaps also as description of the "in-between" nature of Finnish identity between the West (represented by Sweden) and the East (represented by Russia).

Following the ideological leanings of Ardwidson and by extension Herder, Finnish politician and philosopher Johan Vilhelm Snellman conceptualized the idea of a Finnish nation which held the idea of the centrality of language to the "true" character of a nation.

9 Klinge 1999, p. 64.
10 Engman 1995, p. 182.
11 Ibid.
12 Johan Gottfried Herder was a German philosopher of the 18th century. His emphasis on the distinctiveness of national cultures through ethnic markers, most notably language, sets this form of ethnic nationalism from what is called civic nationalism which focus on common political units. See Forster 2018 and Özkirimli 2010.
13 Quoted in Kirby 2009, p. 91.

Hence for the Finnish nationalists (the Fennomans) the unequal status of Finnish and Swedish was an obstacle against achieving an "authentic" national identity, despite the fact that most of these intellectuals were Swedish speakers themselves. Of course, this idealization also had a practical element to it, there was an essential need for the loyalty of the Finnish speaking majority against possible pressure on behalf of the Russian empire. In other words, it was politically unrealistic to construct a national identity based on the minority Swedish speaking population, despite the historical importance of the language.[14]

For the Russian side the calculations to support (or at least tolerate) the development of a Finnish national identity was based on deep suspicion of links between the Swedish language and its speakers in Finland and Russia's historical competitor, Sweden. By supporting the development of the Finnish national identity, the Russians intended to break the cultural link between Sweden and Finland to assure that the Finns would not act in Swedish interests in case of a military conflict in the region. As a result of this relatively positive attitude towards the development of Finnish language, the Finnish literature society was founded in 1831 and from the 1840's the use of Finnish was accepted in certain areas of the public sector.[15]

Snellman partially achieved his aims when he obtained the position of Finance Minister in the Imperial Senate of the Grand Duchy. After the Diet reconvened in 1863, he pushed for a language reform in the country, which established the use of Finnish in lower courts and public administration in 1883. This reform then led to the recognition of full legal equality between the two languages in 1902.[16]

With the increased pressure on the Swedish language in Finland, a counterpart nationalist movement developed among the Swedish speaking intellectuals who did not share the same enthusiasm towards the majority language or culture. This movement had been called the Svecomans. The Svecomans emphasized the importance of the cultural links to Sweden and Scandinavia as a whole, through the Swedish language and claimed that the Swedish speaking population constituted its own nationality.[17] The Svecoman counterpart of Snellman may be found in the character of Alex Olof Freudenthal. His ideas of a Swedish nation in Finland, combined with the "scientific" racism of the 19th century, has led to interpretations of the "racial" supremacy of the Swedish speakers.[18]

After the introduction of universal suffrage in 1906, the original Swedish Party of the Svecomans had joined forces with the Liberals to establish the Swedish People's Party, which is still active today and has been speculated by some to garner around 70 percent of

14 Engman 1995, pp. 185–188.
15 McRae 1999, pp. 35–36.
16 Ekberg 1997, pp. 23–24.
17 Lavery 2006, p. 59.
18 MacRae 1999 p. 38.

the Swedish speaking vote.[19] This party has played a crucial role in uniting the rural and urban divide within the Swedish speaking population by placing the "language question" as its primary issue above all others.[20]

2.3 Independent Finland

Finland gained independence in 1917 after a period of Russification attempts in the late 19th and early 20th century. The civil war that followed Finnish independence also had consequences in terms of inter-group relations between Finnish and Swedish speakers. Hämäläinen highlights the support of the Swedish speakers against the Russification of Finland and their overrepresentation in the winning "White" side of the civil war as the two main factors that produced favourable conditions for Swedish language and its ability to remain as a *de jure* equal language (through the 1919 Constitution and 1922 Language Act) to Finnish despite the demographic disadvantage of the group.[21]

Despite the difficulties experienced in the 1920's and 1930's within the context of the illiberal trend in Europe, the tensions between the two camps were largely set aside in the aftermath of the Winter War when the Swedish speakers showed no hesitation to "prove" their loyalty to Finland, contrary to the suspicions of many Finnish nationalists.[22]

It is hard to claim that the Swedish language in Finland was the most pressing issue in the mainstream political discourse of the country in the post-Second World War era. In this period, the Swedish People's Party (*Svenska Folkpartiet*) took upon itself to remain in government and promote the interests of Swedish speakers and maintain a voice for the status of Swedish in Finland. This includes including advocating mandatory Swedish language education for Finnish speakers in upper comprehensive school. The Swedish People's Party was almost continuously in government in the post-war era until the 2015 elections. This election brought not only the end of a period of the Swedish People's Party in government, but also the inclusion into government of a right-wing populist party with deep hostility towards the status of Swedish language in Finland, the (True) Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset*).

19 For a recent study see Magma 2019.
20 Allardt 1977, pp. 9–10 and Broo 1995, p. 59
21 Hämäläinen 1979, pp. 73–87.
22 Engman 1995, pp. 205–207.

3. Swedish Language in Finland and the Populism of the (True) Finns

Populism has been somewhat of a buzzword in recent political science research. It has produced a wide range of literature on the concept of populism through theoretical and practical lenses[23]. It has been argued that the concept of populism may be approached from three distinct perspectives: the ideational approach[24], the political strategical approach[25]and the socio-cultural approach[26]. This article will adopt the ideational approach to highlight the importance of ideas in the party's construction of an opposition towards the status of Swedish language in Finland as opposed to strategy and leader-based analyses of the two other approaches. It will be argued that the opposition to the existence of two equal national languages in Finland by the Finns Party derives from a politicisation of the historical experience outlined in the previous section, primarily through a populist ideational framework as mentioned by Mudde.

Finland has a relatively new place in the studies of right-wing populist parties when compared to other examples such as the Front National in France or the Danish People's Party in Denmark which had already established their positions on the national scale in the 1970's. The Finns Party has only risen to prominence in the late 2000's[27]. This said, Finland was no stranger to rural populism and the origins of the Finns Party lie with the historical experience of the Finnish Rural Party (*Suomen Maaseudun Puolue- SMP*). During its existence from 1959 to 1995, the party had primarily focused on its staunchly populistic opposition to the "urban elite" (i.e. Helsinki) and claimed that it spoke on behalf of the "forgotten" people in the country side[28]. The successor party (the Finns Party) was founded in 1995 and included many of the SMP members such as Timo Soini who became leader in 1997. The Finns Party remained on the fringes until the significant results of the 2011 Parliamentary Elections where the party became the second largest in parliament with 19.1 percent of the vote. Ylä-Antilla argues that the primary reason for this election success can be found in Timo Soini's intention to broaden the rural populist voter base by appealing to the anti-immigrant urban voter[29]. Jungar and Jupskås had previously noted

23 For more on contemporary populism research see Kaltwasser et al. 2017 and de la Torre 2018.
24 According to the ideational approach: "populism is essentially a set of ideas, connected to an essential struggle between 'the good people' and 'the corrupt elite'." Quoted in Mudde 2017, p. 41.
25 According to the political strategy approach: "Populism is best defined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers." Quoted in Weyland 2017, p. 50.
26 According to the socio-cultural approach: populism is defined as the antagonistic, mobilizational flaunting in politics of the culturally popular and native, and of personalism as a mode of decision-making Quoted in Ostiguy 2017, p. 84.
27 Bergman 2016, p. 82.
28 Arter 2010, p. 486.
29 Ylä-antilla 2017, pp. 26–27.

the ideational convergence of the Finns Party with other right-wing populist parties in the Nordic region, despite their differences in origin[30].

The application of the “set of ideas” that constitute populism to the Finnish lanugage version name of the party name will give an indication of how the party constructs the dialectical antagonism between the “people” and the “elite”. Taking apart the two components of the name *Perussuomalaiset* we find the prefix *perus* which roughly translates to “basic” or “ordinary” attached to *suomalaiset* which in its totality translates to “basic Finns” or “ordinary Finns”[31]. On face value, this does not appear to constitute an exclusionary idea of Finnish identity. However, the implicit normativity in the term “ordinary” within a populist and ethno-nationalist framework may transform to an outright majoritarian opposition to the status of minorities, which in this case also constitutes the image of “the elite”. This transformation will be analysed below.

As mentioned above, the Finns Party began to take a larger position in Finnish political discourse after their “breakthrough” into the mainstream in the 2011 elections. For example, in an interview for a Nordic Council publication about Nordic Languages Finns Party MP Maria Tolppanen immediately felt the need to emphasize that the Swedish speaking minority “had too much power and too much [sic!] privileges compared to their proportion”.[32] The argument here is seemingly based on democratic principles, however this also decontextualizes Swedish language as an absolute “foreign” language in Finland existing outside the historical experience summarized in the first section.

Another issue pushed by the Finns Party in this era was the “scandal” revolving around the “Freudenthal Medal” usually awarded to prominent Swedish speaking Finns by the Swedish People’s Party. The Finns Party representatives, among them then-Minister of Defence Jussi Niinistö, claimed that it was an outrage that in today’s Finland, a political party was handing out medals in the name of a “known racist”.[33] This is particularly interesting coming from a party who had Jussi Halla-aho (who had been convicted for inciting ethnic hate the year before) and other members of the well know radical right-wing organization Suomen Sisu among its ranks. Once again, one may observe implications of the old connection between Swedish language as a marker of social status and the memory of the Svecoman movement being utilized to agitate certain feelings of suppression and inferiority put forward by 19th century racial theories.

Moving on to the 2015 elections, with the “language policy” document, which is not available in Swedish, on the Finns Party website we see yet another set of images regarding the foreign nature of Swedish in Finland and several complaints regarding the costs of

30 Jungar and Jupsksås 2014, pp. 215–217.
31 Raunio 2013, p. 133
32 Quoted in Arvidsson 2012, p. 97.
33 See Siren 2013.

sustaining "artificial bilingualism" while at the same time proposing expenditure on "Finno-Ugric" languages even outside of Finnish borders.[34] The harshest criticism towards Swedish perhaps comes from the following excerpt:

> The Finns Party does not accept outsiders setting up standards for how people judge themselves. We feel that Finnish-speaking Finns can be constructive members of Finnish society without any knowledge or concern for the Swedish language or culture. There must be respect for what language skills a person thinks they need. [35]

This short passage gives a quite clear picture of what the Finns Party views as "ordinary Finns". Firstly, they begin by framing a situation in which the Finnish language and identity are under attack in Finland not only by immigrants but Swedish speakers as well. Secondly, by emphasizing the link between language and culture they are utilizing the Hederian idea of language as the "spirit" of the nation and hence Swedish by definition cannot belong to Finland or the Finns. It is doubtful that their idea of "citizen's own feelings of identity" refers to the lack of Swedish language services in formally bilingual municipalities.

The mandatory Swedish language education in Finnish upper compulsory schools is another matter the Finns Party has taken issue with. Even after joining the government coalition in 2015, the party's chairman of the youth branch, Sebastian Tynkkynen had made a short clip in 2016 in which he was being "whipped" while the slogan "Nothing is mandatory except dying and studying Swedish" was accompanying the scene.[36] The imagery here is once again victimhood of the poor and ordinary Finnish speaker against the elite, the Swedish speaking dominators from the outside.

Even more recently, during the party congress in June 2017 which led to the fragmentation of the party, the newly elected leader of the party, Jussi Halla-aho claimed that "Bilingualism had served its time" and that he "would speak Finnish in his homeland".[37] Similarly, during the 2018 presidential election debates Laura Huhtasaari, the Finns Party candidate simply refused to speak Swedish despite participating in the Swedish language debate on Yle.[38] One can only speculate about the potential reaction a Swedish speaking Finnish politician would receive from the Finns Party should they chose to speak Swedish in a Finnish language debate.

During the process which led to the 2019 Parliamentary Elections the condition of the ongoing status of Swedish as a requirement for employment within the City of Helsinki was polled among the candidates of the political parties in Helsinki. Only two of the parties maintained a majority of candidates willing to support this requirement. Unsurprisingly, 81 percent of the candidates from the Swedish People's Party were opposed to removing

34 Finns Party, *Language Policy,* pp. 5–6.
35 Id. p. 3.
36 See Langh 2016.
37 See Karlsson 2017.
38 See Johansson 2018.

this requirement in favour of easing the employment of immigrants in Helsinki. What was surprising was that 59 percent of Finns Party candidates also opposed this requirement based on the premise that “language requirements should be the same for all” and that “language requirements should not be eased in order to make it easier for immigrants to gain employment”[39]. This is an interesting coalescence between a minority-oriented party which is for protecting the status of the language and a party which prioritises protecting “the ordinary people” through populist ethno-nationalism. This brings into question the relationship between the Swedish People’s Party and their limits regarding immigrant integration. However, the Finns Party remains internally consistent within populist logics which promote a majoritarian solution rather than a group-based rights and statuses.

As Finnäs notes, the memory of the requirement for Finns to acquire Swedish language to achieve upward mobility in society does not disappear as quickly as the memory of the significant socio-economic development of the Finnish speaking majority in the long term.[40] This has been a crucial element of the Finns Party discourse on the status Swedish language, the “good people” or “silent majority” must be defended against the “corrupt elites”.

4. Conclusion

Despite the easing of tensions between the Finnish and Swedish speaking groups in Finland after the Winter War, the historical experience of Swedish language as marker of higher social status is still very much utilized by Finnish populists in contemporary times. The same memory of supremacy overrides the actual situation of the Swedish speaking Finns as a minority with declining proportion in relation to the overall population and the Finnish penetration into the traditionally Swedish speaking areas. It has been argued that opposition to the status of Swedish language in Finland has been viewed through a populist ideational framework. This opposition is primarily constructed around a combination of a belief in a struggle between “the good people” (i.e. the Finnish speaking majority) and “the corrupt elite” (i.e. the Swedish speaking minority) and an exclusionary conceptualisation of Finnishness based in Hederian ethno-nationalism. This constitutes an ideational construction beyond the confines of understanding populism as a political strategy or as a socio-cultural phenomenon. The point of departure for the Finns Party’s opposition to the status of Swedish appears to be the normativity given to majoritarianism and the emotional politicisation of historical experiences between language groups.

39 See Mannila 2019.
40 Finnäs 1995, p. 73.

References

Alapuro, Risto, (1988) *State and Revolution in Finland.* Berkley: University of California Press

Allardt, Erik, (1977) *Finland's Swedish Speaking Minority,* Research Group for Comparative Sociology University of Helsinki, No.17, Helsinki

Arter, David (2010) The Breakthrough of Another West European Populist Radical Right Party? The Case of the True Finns in *Government and Opposition* 45(3) pp. 484–504.

Arvidsson, Karin (2012), *Does the Nordic Region Speak with a FORKED Tongue? The Queen of Denmark, the Government Minister and others give their views on the Nordic language community*, Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers. Retrieved From: http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/Nord2012–008.

Bergmann, Eirikur (2016) *Nordic Nationalism and Right-Wing Populist Politics: Imperial Relationship and National Sentiments* UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Broo, Roger (1995) The Swedish Speaking Minority in Finland: A Case Study in Pentikäinen, Juha and Hiltunen Marja (eds.) *Cultural Minorities in Finland: An Overview Towards Cultural Policy* Helsinki: Publications of the Finnish National Commission for Unesco No.66, pp. 58–63.

De la Torre, Carlos (ed.) (2018) *Routledge Handbook of Global Populism* London: Routledge.

Engman, Max (1995) Finns and Swedes in Finland in Tägil, Sven (ed.) *Ethnicity and Nation Building in The Nordic World* London: Hurst and Company pp. 179–216.

Ekberg, Henrik (1997) Under the Russian Tsar in Beijar, Kristina. Ekberg, Henrik. Eriksson, Susanne. and Tandefelt, Marika. *Life in Two Languages: The Finnish Experience* Espoo: Schildts pp. 15–24

Finnas, Fjalar (1995) The Swedish Speaking Minority in Finland: A Case Study in Pentikäinen, Juha and Hiltunen Marja (eds.) *Cultural Minorities in Finland: An Overview Towards Cultural Policy* Helsinki: Publications of the Finnish National Commission for Unesco No.66, pp. 70–73.

Finns Party (N/A) *Language policy* Retrieved from URL: https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ps_language_policy.pdf (visited 15.02.2019)

Forster, Micheal (2018) Johan Gottfried von Herder in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/herder/

Heininen, Simo (2017) *Mikael Agricola: Hans liv och verk* Poland: Artos and Noma Bokförlag.

Hämäläinen, Pekka Kalevi (1979) *In Time of Storm: Revolution, Civil War and the Ethnolinguistic issue in Finland* New York: State University of New York Press.

Johansson, Pia (2018, January 22) *Presidentkandidaterna debatterar vapenexport och feministisk utrikespolitik - se Svenska Yles tvåspråkiga valdebatt* Svenska YLE Retrieved From: https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2018/01/22/presidentkandidaterna-debatterar-vapenexport-och-feministisk-utrikespolitik-se

Jungar, Ann-Cathrine and Jupskås, Anders Revik (2014) Populist Radical Right Parties in the Nordic Region:A New and Distinct Party Family? In *Scandinavian Political Studies* 37(3), pp. 215–238.

Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira. Taggart, Paul. Espejo, Paulina Ochoa. and Ostiguy, Pierre. (eds.) (2017) *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* UK: Oxford University Press.

Karlsson, Anders (2017, June 11) *Tvåspråkigheten har levt ut sin tid* Svenska YLE, Retrived From: https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2017/06/11/halla-aho-tvasprakigheten-har-levt-ut-sin-tid

Kirby, David (2009) *A Concise History of Finland* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Klinge, Matti (1999) *A Brief History of Finland* Keruu: Otava Publishing Company

Langh, Sarah (2016, December 28) *Sannfinländsk video väcker avsky – var finns etiken, undrar SFP-ledare* Svenska Yle, Retrieved From: https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2016/12/28/sannfinlandsk-video-vacker-avsky-var-finns-etiken-undrar-sfp-ledare

Lavery, John (2006) *The History of Finland* London: Greenwood Press

Libekind, Karmela (1985) The Swedish Speaking Minority in Finland: A Case Study in Pentikäinen, Juha and Hiltunen Marja (eds.) *Cultural Minorities in Finland: An Overview Towards Cultural Policy* Helsinki: Publications of the Finnish National Commission for Unesco No.66, pp. 69–70

Magma Tankesmedja (2019, April 3) *Opinionsmätning bland svenskspråkiga – regeringen måste bytas* Magma, Retrieved From: http://www.magma.fi/post/2019/4/3/opinionsmatning-bland-svensksprakiga-regeringen-maste-bytas

Mannila, Saga (2019, March 28) *SFP och Sannfinländarna vill inte lätta på tvåspråkighetskraven i Helsingfors – i nuläget svårt för invandrare att få job* Svenska Yle, Retrieved from: https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2019/03/28/sfp-och-sannfinlandarna-vill-inte-latta-pa-tvasprakighetskraven-i-helsingfors-i

McRae, Kenneth D. (1999) *Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Finland* Rauma: The Finnish Academy of Science and Letters.

Mudde, Cas (2017) Populism: An Ideational Approach in Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (et al.) *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* UK: Oxford University Press pp. 27–47.

Ostiguy, Pierre (2017) Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach in Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (et al.) *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* UK: Oxford University Press pp. 74–99.

Özkırımlı, Umut (2010) *Theories of Natıonalism: A Critical Introduction* UK: Palgrave Macmillian.

Raunio, Tapio (2013). The Finns: Filling a cap in the party system. In Grabow, Karsten and Hartleb, Florian (eds.) *Expoising the demagogues: Right-wing and national populist parties in Europe* . Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 133–160.

Singleton, Fred (1998) *A Short History of Finland* UK: Cambridge University Press.

Siren, Stina (2013, February 22) *Sannf tar fram Freudenthal-kortet* Svenska YLE, Retrived From: https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2013/02/22/sannf-tar-fram-freudenthal-kortet

Weyland, Kurt (2017) Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach in Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (et al.) *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* UK: Oxford University Press pp. 48–73.

Ylä-anttila, Tuuka (2017) *The Populist Toolkit: Finnish Populism in Action 2007–2016* (Doctoral Dissertation) Helsinki: University of Helsinki.